

History

Contradictory Nature of Georgian – Armenian Relations in the Background of the Global Strategic Policy during “Trabzon Peace Conference” In March, 1918

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ABSTRACT. After the Bolshevik revolt of October 25, 1917, following the overthrow of the temporary government in St. Petersburg, the existence of Ozakom was exhausted its purpose and it was replaced by the Transcaucasian Commissariat, which regarded itself as temporary authority before the election of the founding council in Russia. It was necessary to define correct orientation in foreign matters. On March 3, 1918, Soviet Russia signed a treaty with Germany and its allies, with Article 4 of which it had to provide the immediate return of East Anatolia to the former owner. It also urged the immediate release of Ardahan, Kars and Batumi districts from Russian army. In fact, additional agreement between Russia and Turkey took into account to restore the Russia-Ottoman prewar borders of 1877-1878, which determined the boundary demarcation line between the Soviet Russia and three Sanjaks (Ardahan, Kars, Batumi) (in reality it was the new borders of Russia and Turkey. N. Z.). Thus, the Bolshevik Russia gave Transcaucasian arena to the Ottomans, but this concession wasn't clearly formulated. Apparently, the results of the Brest Treaty for the Ottoman Empire leading with quick steps towards the final victory, seemed to be enough to declare all the Sanjaks as their legitimate possessions. After confiscating the founding council in Moscow (January 6, 1918) the Transcaucasian Commissariat faced a strict reality. Not recognizing a Bolshevik government was not a way out. Here again, the issue of foreign political orientation became actual. The government which was in the political deadlock had the Ottoman proposal to be its supporter. In particular, the Transcaucasian authority was offered to negotiate on the issues they needed. The Ottoman side expressed its readiness to negotiate with the “Independent Caucasus Government”. A Transcaucasian Commissariat and Sejm understood that the war would be difficult with the Ottoman Empire, therefore they tried to resolve the conflict diplomatically. © 2018 Bull. Georg. Natl. Acad. Sci.

Key words: Transcaucasian Sejm, Georgia, Armenia, Trabzon, Batumi

In March 1918, Trabzon (now the Black Sea town of the Republic of Turkey) started Transcaucasian-Ottoman peace negotiations. At the conference a special attention was paid to the issue

of affiliation of Batumi. On March 1, 1918, Transcaucasian Seym approved the composition of the Trabzon Peace Negotiations Delegation to the Ottoman Empire.

At the same session, Seym approved “basic provisions” that the necessary condition for peace negotiations should have been to restore the Russian-Ottoman pre-war borders of 1914. In addition, the delegation should have fought for the self-determination of East Anatolia and for giving right of autonomy for Ottoman Armenia. According to G. Gvazava's opinion, it should be added the issue of the right of autonomy for the Assyrians [1].

On March 10, 1918, in parallel of preparation for negotiations in Trabzon, the Ottoman commanders-in-chief officially requested Transcaucasian side and demanded the “evacuation of Sanjaks of Batumi, Kars and Ardahan in the shortest period of time” and the withdrawal of troops in the borders of 1877 [2].

After the Ottomans seized Trabzon, it was obvious that they did not concede positions, so the following question was put before the Seym – “War or Truce”? On March 11, a special session meeting was held in Tbilisi to solve this difficult issue where N. Zhordania gave his speech. He emphasized the significance of Batumi and Kars for Transcaucasia, that it needed to be protected and noted that the Social Democratic Party (Georgian Mensheviks Party) would do its best in this regard. If there was no peace negotiation in Trabzon, the Dashnaks’ (Armenian party) party (based on the necessity) would express a desire for the readiness of war. But the Musavatels (Azerbaijan Party) did not share the position of preparation for war.

On March 12, 1918, the Ottoman delegation headed to the Trabzon four days later headed by an experienced diplomat Rauf Bey [1:9].

The Trabzon Peace Conference was held between March 14 and April 5, 1918; 6 meetings of the Conference, 2 hearings and "Private Session of Transcaucasia and Ottoman Delegations" were

held. The first meeting of the peace talks was held in 1918, 1-14 March, at 3 pm. The delegation of Transcaucasia was mainly composed of Seym members (head Akaki Chkhenkeli, and delegates were Haydar Abashidze, Memed-Hassan Gajinski, Ibrahim Beg Heidarov, Giorgi Gvazava, Ruben Kachaznun, Giorgi Laskhishvili, Mir Jagub Mekhtiyev, Alexander Khatsov, Akper Sheikh-Ul Ismamov) [1:1].

Rauf Bey was elected as the Chairman of the sessions, who said in his welcome speech that “we are not only historically and geographically related to each other, but also we are relatives and our roots are in our common past ... Caucasian and Turkish peoples are united by religions and nations and have almost identical history” [1:14].

With this statement Rauf Bey meant that these negotiations had a far-reaching political background, otherwise what could explain the baseless assertion of the identity of the Georgian, Armenian and Ottoman religious beliefs.

The Ottomans have great hopes for Azerbaijanis as one of the religious people, but it should be said that the Azerbaijan side more or less tried to protect Transcaucasian common interests, although the wishes to shift to the Ottomans’ side were noticeable, but at this moment and afterwards the Azeris were refraining from expressing a clear political alliance with the Ottoman Empire. Perhaps this was their diplomatic maneuver; In a word, beyond their moral support their activities did not turn into the active alliance.

The Ottomans asked the delegation to explain the forms of political and administrative arrangement of Transcaucasian republic [1:24].

At the second meeting of the Conference A. I. Chkhenkeli described the political governance form of in Transcaucasian Republic. He said that Transcaucasian Republic has a democratically elected Seym as the supreme body of the authority. As far as the Brest Peace Conference touched upon Transcaucasian republics and at the same time the truce signed by the Bolshevik government was

unacceptable for them, the truce conditions about Transcaucasia, were losing their significance according to the norms of international law. “South Caucasus will directly resolve its problems with the neighboring state and this should be a leitmotif of our meeting”, - stated A. Chkhenkeli [1:19].

A. Chkhenkeli's opinion reflected more his good will than a strong political argumentation. South Caucasus had not even declared independence at that time, and Bolsheviks in the Brest Conference gave their speeches on behalf of the whole Russia. Such uncertainty in Transcaucasia region was obviously favorable to Ottoman.

The previous mistakes, which were like a Sword of Damocles for Transcaucasian delegation, enabled the Ottomans to organize the conference in the desired direction. As Rauf Bey explained, their side came here not to discuss the Brest Truce but to participate in a new negotiation and there was no other purpose other than to prepare the grounds for economic and commercial relations [1:25].

On March 16, the third meeting of the Conference was held, where the Ottoman delegation demanded the recognition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. A. Chkhenkeli replied that Transcaucasian Republic did not recognize the Treaty signed between other states.

As Rauf Bey stated, despite the international law, the treaty between the two countries is not mandatory for the third state, but in fact, Transcaucasian Republic does not exist, [3].

It turns out that for the Ottoman Party the conference was to deal with secondary issues emerging in the Brest Treaty negotiations, as the main political issues were resolved during negotiations with the delegation of Bolshevik government. Thus, if Transcaucasia wanted to put an issue in the broader political spectrum, then the act to separate from Russia was necessary. This is what the Ottomans demanded [1].

On March 16, 17 and 18, 1918 the meetings of Transcaucasian peacekeeping delegations were

held. On March 20th, the fourth meeting of the Conference was dedicated to the issue of recognition or non-recognition of the Brest Truce, which discussed the arguments presented by the parties [1,3]. On March 17, at the internal working session of Transcaucasian peacekeeping delegation, the head of the delegation Akaki Chkhenkeli made an informative report about the content of his private conversation with the head of the Ottoman peacekeeping delegation, Hüseyin Rauf Bey. In his opinion, Transcaucasian delegation would have to make some concessions in the process of further negotiations, including the territories.

According to Chkhenkeli, territorial concessions would have to be done without infringing the vital interests of Transcaucasia.

The delegation also became aware of the position of Turkish side; Turkey was actually interested in the independence of Transcaucasian state, but only by the condition of the restoration of the 1877 borders. As for the issue of self-determination of Armenia (defining the status of autonomy for Armenian lands on the territory of Turkey was one of the main issues of Transcaucasian delegation's work plan, N. Z.), the Turkish side considered it inadmissible to discuss during negotiations with Transcaucasian delegation.

According to the delegation member G. Gvazava, removing the issue of Turkey's Armenian autonomy from the agenda was caused by the necessity and it should have included to the issue of returning amnestied and refugee Armenians to the homeland, and in relation to the territorial concessions, it would have been the concession of the districts that would not disrupt Transcaucasian unity. He viewed Oltu, Kagizmann and Kars as such districts [3]. This view of the Georgian delegate was followed by an adequate response from Ruben Kachaznun, the representative of the Armenian side. In his view, the above mentioned opinion was one-sided and if the matter was to be

reviewed it would be appropriate to start concessions with Batumi district [3].

The disagreement among the delegation members was clearly visible. On this background, the Armenian delegate Aleksandre Khatisov's opinion was of compromising content. He noted that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was not about self-determination, but about the concession of some part of the state territory. Kars, Ardahan and Batumi are strategic fortresses, so that at first stage the concessions should touch the territories that are located south of these fortresses -he stated. According to Khatisov, if the Turkish side would no longer refuse Kars, Transcaucasian delegation should have maintained the Roadway Artvin-Artanuji-Ardahan, as well as the eastern part of the Kars region [3]. His viewpoint in connection with the Armenian autonomy in Turkey was also remarkable. "It must enter into the domestic policy of Turkey, but it will still be the issue of Armenian territorial autonomy, with the provision of returning the Armenians into their national districts and the settlement"- he noted [4]. The Armenian delegate Memed-Hassan Gajinski thought that the disputed fortresses should have been destroyed at all.

On March 18, a private meeting of Transcaucasian peacekeeping delegation was totally devoted to the concession of territories to Turkey and to discussing the issues of Armenian autonomy in the Turkish state. A. Khatisov's and R. Kachaznun's speeches had particularly emotional background. Of course, the Armenian side tried to avoid territorial losses for Armenia. They were proving that by means of various sources of different arguments in a variety of contents, some of which were even inadequate with the actual situation. Georgian side did its best to effectively cope with and assert with contradictory arguments the necessity of maintaining the most complicated territorial losses of the Batumi district.

The negotiation of Trabzon fell into a deadlock and became complicated. The Ottomans considered

the Brest Treaty as a basis for further agreement. In their opinion, the question of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi districts was not subject to any judgments, since the Ottoman Empire had obtained the right to accede to these territories. Obviously, the issue of South Caucasus, with absolute maintenance of its territories, could not be positively solved. Which lands should be handed over to the Ottomans? This was a real problem. For Azerbaijan, as not neighboring country of the Ottoman, this was not the case. As for the Armenian and Georgian delegates, there was a clear disagreement between them.

The option of transferring a certain part of the territory was developed, according to which the Region of Kagizmann from Kars district was supposed to be taken by Ottoman Empire and from the Ardahan district - the Oltu Region. With such a combination, Georgia would retain Potskhov-Erusheti, which would be equal to the territory left in the Kars district for Armenia [3].

One circumstance is also noteworthy. As far as Baku oil was exported through Batumi, Azerbaijan was supporting Georgia to sustain Batumi District. However, the real situation was the following, for example: If Transcaucasia could not solve the controversial issues through diplomatic ways, that would obvious follow the escalation of hostilities, then Azerbaijan was largely unable to take responsibility due to its religious principles to help South Caucasus with its military forces. [5].

The fifth meeting of the conference was held on March 21. A. Chkhenkeli noted that Transcaucasian delegation was still not aware of the Brest Treaty and Transcaucasian Seym was authorized to sign up a truce with Ottomans [3]. In return Rauf Bey answered that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was signed with the "Government of the Russian Republic" and "Caucasian Government" was not yet established at that time. Consequently, its government was not recognized. Therefore, the Ottoman delegation believes that it cannot neither deny the provisions of the Treaty nor approve [2].

By the request of Transcaucasian delegation, they decided to stop the conference for a while.

On March 21 and 23, the sessions of Transcaucasian peacekeeping delegations were held. A. Chkhenkeli presented a project on transferring territories to the Ottomans for consideration, according to which "1) the entire Oltu district; 2) More than half of Ardahan district; 3) The Kars District Monument below Akhmeta; 4) Kagizmann district except Kagizmann and its northern part. I.e. all this would be handed over to the Turkish side" [3]. Apparently, A. Chkhenkeli tried to save this way (from entering the Ottoman State) parts of Ardahan, Kars and Kagizmann districts and Artvin and Batumi districts entirely. But other members of the delegation did not share his view to transfer the part of the territories and "to win the Ottomans' hearts" this way. The member of the delegation R. I. Kachaznun particularly protested transferring the Kars and Kagizmann districts to Ottomans, where, he said, 67% of Armenians lived in Kars and 58% - in Kagizmann (Russian and Greek residents were also added) and they did not want to join the Ottomans. Other members of the delegation demanded to fight against the self-determination of people in Anatolia ("the establishment of the Armenian Autonomy of Turkey") and to think about other people (Assyrian, Kurds, Greeks and others).

According to A. I. Khatsov, another member of the delegation, "it is vain to think about the projects that are doomed from the very beginning; because in every case we will have to give these districts to the winner "(Ottomans-G.K.) [3].

In our view, Khatsov's attitude towards the issue was not correct. It was really worth to offer Chkhenkeli's project to Ottomans to "trade", that might lead to a certain result.

According to Khatsov, "if we cannot vote for issues here, how can we defend our view of the situation before the Sejm, parties, after returning to Tbilisi? The proposals are offered on behalf of the delegation, but without their sanctions. I want to

record in the protocol that you are taking steps independently..." Another member of the delegation, K. B. Khas-Mamedov also requested to include A. Chkhenkeli's project in the journal without voting. It seems that he thought that if the case would be spoiled, he would have been responsible for all. It is obvious that the delegation members were quite nervous and panicked and the instinct of self-survival prevailed in them.

A. Chkhenkeli correctly foresaw the situation and answered them: "Unfortunately for me, it seems to me that they are going to sacrifice me when I am imposed over all the responsibilities. But this paper must be issued on behalf of the entire delegation ..." [3].

In the end, Transcaucasian Sejm has to decide the position of the delegation and the proposal for the Ottomans. The Trabzon conference was taking place on the background of the military situation. In the created hard and domestic conditions, the leading political parties of Transcaucasia, namely the Social Democrats, the Dashnaks, and the Musavatels, conducted their activities not via protecting their common interests, but by the "national principle" which further complicated the issue and "played into the Ottomans' hands". The condition of the front was becoming more and more difficult every day. In mid-March the Ottomans besieged Ardahan and other points. They started to group forces to cross over Kars and Batumi. Robbing and firing the villages inhabited by Armenians and Greeks became more frequent. It was difficult to evacuate the Christian population. The situation in Akhaltsikhe and the Batumi district was extremely complicated.

In such a situation, Transcaucasian Sejm convened meeting sessions, discussing the issues of Ardahan, Artvin, Kars and Transcaucasian borders in general, as well as the liquidation of the Armenian-Ottomans' conflict and the issues related to other domestic problems. The Sejm members were sent to find out the situation at the site. According to the materials presented by them it was

clear that the situation in the country was the hardest.

The Georgian and Armenian sides found it difficult to agree on a uniform position. Nevertheless, finally a compromise proposal was made and the delegation of Transcaucasian delegation presented the Memorandum to the Ottoman Territories according to which the territories to be transferred to Ottomans were: the southern part of the Oltu-Ardahan District and the southwest part of Kagizmann-Kars district. The Ottoman side made a new maneuver and sent the Memorandum to the Empire government in Istanbul to get acquainted with it. With that the official sessions were over, and soon the Erzincan provisional agreement was violated and military conflicts renewed again.

The Turkish historiography has established an idea that the main purpose of the Ottoman delegation in Trabzon was to maintain peace and stability between them and the Caucasian neighbors. But we should also take into consideration that the rights of the delegation of the Ottoman side were limited. The head of the delegation, Rauf Bey, addressed the government with a request to increase his powers, which was not satisfied. For this and many other reasons the further negotiations were senseless, it is useless [6].

As we can see from the minutes of the session, the Trabzon Conference was deadlocked. The Turkish side was trying to negotiate in all its favor. They insistently cited the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. It was believed that the political judgment of Kars, Ardahan and Batumi districts was not the task of their negotiations in Trabzon, because, they thought that issue had already been decided. Thus, even if tried many times, Transcaucasian side could not solve the problem of maintaining its territories in its favor. If this happened this way, then Turkey should give up what was practically impossible in that situation. That is why the specific question was asked - which lands should be given. This was a dilemma for Transcaucasian delegation to Trabzon.

It was difficult to answer this question even for Transcaucasian Sejm in Tbilisi. Azerbaijan, included in Transcaucasian de-facto federation, as a non-neighboring and bordering country to Turkey, was less concerned about this issue. As for the Georgian and Armenian representatives of the delegation, this issue caused apparent disagreement and misunderstanding between them. We should also take into consideration that, along with the strategic and economic aspects of the possible loss of territory, there were no less political motivations. Although in the military-strategic standpoint the South Caucasia was clearly lost by losing Kars and Ardahan, but if it lost the Batumi district, the loss would be extremely great in a strategic-economic point of view and with political consequences as well.

Notwithstanding the compromise proposal discussed above, which should have been acceptable for the Georgian and Armenian sides, the latter still did not express their satisfaction. It could be said that the aim of Armenia was to maintain its territories as much as possible; The vision of the common South Caucasian problems was discussable after accomplishing its own interests and objectives.

As for Azerbaijan, it was clearly supporting the maintenance of Batumi. They were encouraged by their intentions, which were motivated by economic aspects.

On March 25 a meeting of Transcaucasian Sejm was held [7], where the speeches of Transcaucasian delegation on negotiations in Trabzon were given. The Sejm adopted a resolution that denied the conditions of the Bret-Litovsk Treaty and gave the head of its delegation an extraordinary extensive authority to act independently in this direction. This resolution gave A. Chkhenkeli a possibility to maneuver in a diplomatic way, which he used.

On April 2, Vekhib-Pasha, the Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasian Front of the Turks

arrived in Trabzon. With his order on April 4, the Askers passed through the border of Batumi without any warning and approached 10 km to the city of Batumi.

The last of the sixth session of the Trabzon Conference was held on April 5. We think A. Chkhenkeli's speech was quite reasonable: "...First of all, how legitimate and legal it is to negotiate only with the Ottoman government and not with the four countries that signed the Treaty of Brett-Litovsk ... Transcaucasian delegation takes into account the desire of both sides to establish a friendly relationship between Transcaucasian peoples and Turkey" [3]. According to A. Chkhenkeli, Transcaucasian delegation agrees to discuss the issue of transferring entire Oltu Okrug, the southern part of Ardahan, the southwestern part of Kars Okrug and the western part of the Kagizmann (there was no mention of the district of Batumi, which A. Chkhenkeli tried to save completely).

On April 6 the Ottomans handed A. Chkhenkeli a 48-hour written ultimatum, by which they demanded the complete transfer of Batumi, Kars and Ardahan districts.

On April 8, A. Chkhenkel offered to the Ottoman delegation in agreement with his government to transfer the whole Artvin Okrug, but the Ottomans were fully demanding the fulfillment of the terms of the Brest Treaty. After that, A. Chkhenkeli sent a telegram to the government saying that it was necessary to recognize the Brest Treaty (and to declare the independence of Transcaucasia), since Ottomans would accept to continue the Peace Conference only after that. This gave the opportunity that the issue of ownership of a number of territories in Batumi and Kars districts to be reconsidered again. A. Chkhenkeli received a response from Tbilisi on April 10. The government believed that it was impossible to fully recognize the Brest Treaty.

After that, on April 11, Ottoman General Vekhib-Pasha sent an ultimatum to the commandant of the

fortified district of Batumi, Giorgi Mdivani, in which he (he had to answer in 12 hours) demanded from him to leave the city until noon on the 13th of April and took the troops into the borders of 1877. The General requested the ultimatum to continue for 24 hours to ask Tbilisi to take the decision of the Seym [1]. Vekhib-Pasha refused to do so and resumed an attack on Batumi on April 13.

On April 13, A. Chkhenkeli twice sent a telegram to the commandant of the fortified district of Batumi and the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia N. Ramishvili explaining that it was necessary to evacuate Batumi in order the conference to be continued, but N. Ramishvili did not agree.

On April 13, Tbilisi hosted Transcaucasian Seym. The chairman of the Government E. Gegechkori introduced the situation at the Trabzon Conference and noted that the part of the Brest Treaty was recognized by the private initiative of Transcaucasian delegation, they were not properly authorized by the government and the Seym after which the Ottomans resumed the attack on Batumi. And now, "there is no other way than war", but the government is asking for the parties to join – he added.

According to E. Gegechkori, the protection of Batumi was achievable. The measures were adopted for strengthening and complementing the military consolidation, which was added by the patriotic mood of the Georgian population.

Finally, Seym unanimously based on the formulation proposed by Noe Zhordania, decided:

- 1) Withdrawal of Transcaucasian Delegation from Trabzon;
- 2) Announcement of warlike situation in the country;
- 3) Creation of a special board for leading a war composed of military, interior and finance ministers;
- 4) Addressing with appropriate manifestation to the population of South Caucasus [8].

On April 14, Transcaucasian Truce delegation left for Tbilisi from Trabzon. On the same day, the

Ottomans took Batumi and continued to attack Ozurgeti and Kars.

On April 16, Enver-Pasha arrived in Trabzon. He was accompanied by Sultan's cousin Prince Omar Faruk and German military officers [9.]. From Trabzon Enver left for Batumi. Reportedly, he declared that it was necessary for South Caucasus to fulfill the terms of the Bret-Litovsk Treaty.

Thus, the Trabzon Peace Conference ended for Transcaucasian delegation without results. Ottomans captured Batumi-Kars-Ardahan and kept an eye on other territories.

Conclusions

Among the reasons for the failure of Transcaucasian delegation in Trabzon the following are particularly noteworthy:

First of all, the Ottoman imperial will and persistent spirit;

On the other hand, the disagreement among the delegation members of Transcaucasia and thinking only of survival;

Third, the incorrect assessment of the situation created by Transcaucasian Sejm that Transcaucasian delegation could not fully endorse its proposal on the recognition of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk.

It was required to produce flexible diplomacy with Germany's ally, obviously a stronger Turkish state. It might not follow any results, but as A. Chkhenkeli mentioned, it was worth it.

It can be said that Trabzon peace negotiations clearly showed a difficult international political situation, which largely led to the contradictions among neighboring states.

ისტორია

ქართულ-სომხური ურთიერთობების წინააღმდეგობრივი ხასიათი გლობალური სტრატეგიული პოლიტიკის ფონზე 1918 წლის მარტში (ტრაპიზონის საზავო კონფერენცია)

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(წარმოდგენილია აკადემიის წევრის გ. ლორთქიფანიძის მიერ)

1918 წლის მარტში ქალაქ ტრაპიზონში (დღეისათვის თურქეთის რესპუბლიკის შაგი-ზღვისპირა ქალაქი) დაიწყო ამიერკავკასია-ოსმალეთის საზავო მოლაპარაკება. აღნიშნულ კონფერენციაზე განსაკუთრებული ყურადღება დაეთმო ქ. ბათუმის კუთვნილების საკითხს. მოლაპარაკებების პროცესში ნათელი გახდა, რომ ამიერკავკასიის დელეგაციას მოუწევდა გარკვეულ დამოთხოვებზე წასვლა, მათ შორის ტერიტორიულსაც. დელეგაციისათვის

ცნობილი გახდა თურქეთის მხარის პოზიციაც; თურქეთი რეალურად დაინტერესებული იყო ამიერკავკასიის სახელმწიფოს დამოუკიდებლობით, მაგრამ მხოლოდ 1877 წლის საზღვრების აღდგენის პირობით. ამიერკავკასია საკითხს, თავისი ტერიტორიების აბსოლუტური შენარჩუნებით, დადებითად ვერ გადაჭრიდა. რომელი მიწები გადაეცათ ოსმალებისათვის? სწორედ ეს გახდა ნამდვილი პრობლემა. აზერბაიჯანს, როგორც ოსმალეთის არამეზობელს, ეს საკითხი არ ეხებოდა. ხოლო რაც შეეხება სომეხ და ქართველ დელეგატებს, მათ შორის აშკარა უთანხმოება წარმოიშვა. შემუშავებულ იქნა ტერიტორიათა გარკვეული ნაწილის გადაცემის ვარიანტი, რომლის მიხედვითაც ოსმალეთს უნდა მიეღო ყარსის ოლქიდან კაგიზმანის რაიონი, არდაჰანის ოლქიდან კი – ოლთისის რაიონი. ამგვარი კომბინაციით არდაჰანის ოლქში საქართველო შეინარჩუნებდა ფოცხოვ-ერუშეთს, რაც სომხეთისათვის ყარსის ოლქში დატოვებული ტერიტორიის ტოლფასი იქნებოდა. ტრაპიზონის კონფერენცია საომარი ვითარების ფონზე მიმდინარეობდა. შექმნილ მძიმე საშინაო და საგარეო პირობებში ამიერკავკასიის წამყვანმა პოლიტიკურმა პარტიებმა, კერძოდ, სოციალ-დემოკრატებმა, დაშნაკებმა და მუსავატელებმა საქმიანობა წარმართეს არა საერთო ინტერესების დაცვის, არამედ „ნაციონალური პრინციპით“, რაც კიდევ უფრო მეტად ართულებდა საკითხს და „ოსმალთა წისქვილზე ასხამდა წყალს“. შეიძლება ითქვას, რომ ტრაპიზონის საზავო მოლაპარაკებას აშკარად აჩნდა რთული საერთაშორისო პოლიტიკური ვითარების დაღი, რაც მეტწილად განაპირობებდა მეზობელ სახელმწიფოთა შორის წარმოქმნილ წინააღმდეგობებს.

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