

History

Analysis of Two Main Political Doctrines of Modern Turkiye

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In the political life of modern Turkey, in the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century, the issue of creating and then changing the new state administration was on the agenda; in the scientific literature it was called the doctrine of Kemalism and Erdoganism. The term Erdoganism first appeared after Erdogan's victory in the general elections in 2011 and gained more recognition on the world stage due to active foreign policy ideals based on neo-Ottomanism. When comparing Kemalism and Erdoganism, it was revealed that these two political doctrines have both similarities and significant differences. There are similarities between them in terms of authoritarianism, the neopatrimonial system and populism, as well as in the issue of nationalist rhetoric. The fundamental differences between them are expressed mainly in the replacement of secularism by Islamism, which is characteristic of Kemalism. At the same time, the principle of westernization of Kemalism was replaced by the policy of separating Erdoganism from the West and opposing it, which had a significant impact on the formation of a new political course for the country. In this paper, we consider the analysis of Kemalism and Erdoganism in a continuous chain, which make it possible to visualize both the historical aspect of the issue and its modern reality. In the present research we draw a clear line on the problems that actively appeared in their relationship. The analysis of the two main political doctrines of modern Turkey - Kemalism and Erdoganism and study of the mentioned issues gave us the opportunity to clearly understand the key issues and historical aspects of the problem, using the method of critical analysis. © 2024 Bull. Georg. Natl. Acad. Sci.

Kemalism, „Erdoganism”, Republic of Turkiye

In the first decade of the 21st century, the events taking place in Turkiye showed us that a new state doctrine is being formed in the country. The question is whether the Republic of Turkiye will continue to follow democratic and European values and retain the state government of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, or it will be presented as a new different state unit.

For Turkiye and its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Islam is the tool with which he wants to stabilize the political system and turn Turkiye into a traditional conservative society with less room to generate social, ethnic and other civil rights protests.

The coming decades will give an answer to the question of whether a country with a Muslim cul-

ture will be able to adapt to a democratic western civilization and what outcomes there will be.

Any country that decides to embrace the values of democratic development needs strong public and political will. By the decision of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938), the founder of the Republic of Türkiye, the path of state development of a country bearing Muslim culture was directed to the West, and the path of Europeanization was proclaimed an unshakable foreign policy principle. Six principles developed by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, known as Kemalism – republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, etatism, revolutionism, are written in the preamble of the Turkish Constitution, and they are not subject to revision at this stage [1].

The political ideology of Kemalism for decades has been Turkish nationalism and secularism. An important characteristic of Kemalism was also the personality cult of Atatürk, a certain proof of which is his surname (translation from Turkish “Father of the Turks”), as well as the name of the ideology that arose on behalf of Atatürk [2].

The founder of the Republic of Türkiye, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founded the new Türkiye on the principles of secularism and Europeanism. The political life of modern Türkiye has largely become the reason for the struggle of this principle with the so-called Turkish traditionalism of a religious nature.

In modern Türkiye, they consider two main political doctrines – Kemalism and Erdoganism, which, despite fundamental differences, have some general characteristics.

For the past twenty-three years, together with the rest of the world, we have been following the political events taking place in the Republic of Türkiye, and observing its charismatic leader, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, as well as the activities of the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)) with Islamic values.

The Justice and Development Party has Islamic roots. Political Islam has a long history in the

country, when it arose in opposition to the doctrine of Kemalism back in the 1970s.

Political parties with Islamic ideology (National Salvation Party, Welfare Party) opposed the principles of Kemalism, including secular nationalism, westernization and modernization. One such party was the Welfare Party (RF), under which mandate Recep Tayyip Erdoğan won elections in 1994 and became mayor of Istanbul.

In 1995-1997, the Welfare Party of Islamic Ideology came to power. On February 28, 1997, President Süleyman Demirel convened a meeting of the National Security Council, at which important changes were made to the political life of Türkiye. As a result, the Welfare Party lost power, but the young reformist generation of Turkish Islamists, among whom was the young R. T. Erdoğan, soon announced a change in their views in favor of democracy and other western values.

Appealing to democratic values, in 2001, with the support of Erdoğan, the Justice and Development Party was founded. It won the 2002 parliamentary elections and came to power; after this accession to the European Union was declared the main priority of the country's foreign policy, despite the fact that the manifesto of the Justice and Development Party, in the so-called strategic depth, declares EU membership as a desirable, but not the main strategic goal of Türkiye.

In the second period of the Justice and Development party's rule (since 2007), there began the process of weakening democratic institutions and the growth of re-Islamization, which the party officially denied (the abolition of the permanent wearing of paranja by women, the introduction of restrictions on the consumption of alcoholic beverages, the opening of religious schools, the introduction of Islam into as a compulsory subject in general education schools and higher educational institutions, including the military academy, etc.).

The government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is actively changing a number of provisions of Ke-

malism today. Erdogan supports the transformation of a democratic, secularist society into a traditional Islamic one and rejects social modernization. He has introduced the so-called new *Turkiye* concept, which is referred to as *Erdoganism* in scientific literature and is characterized by the following features: authoritarianism as a form of government; neopatrimonialism as an economic system; anti-elitism/populism as a political strategy and islamism as a political ideology, nationalism and moralism.

Authoritarian countries are characterized by three main factors: the unequal field of activity left to the opposition, the conduct of elections with serious violations, and the facts of massive human rights violations.

Since 2011, after the Justice and Development Party took over the leadership of the state government for the third time, all of the above signs of authoritarianism were already observed: the field of action for opposition parties and politicians was extremely limited, there were arrests, repressions of independent media.

Although liberal democracy was never established in republican *Turkiye*, free elections have always been held in the country since the 1950s. In the event of a defeat, the authorities peacefully left their ruling positions. But the June and November 2015 elections, and especially the 2017 referendum, showed that this electoral tradition is a thing of the past.

There is no doubt that the essential characteristic of *Erdoganism* as the political rule of the new *Turkiye* is classical authoritarianism.

An important factor characteristic of *Erdoganism* is “neo-patrimonialism”; in a neopatrimonial system, any relationship between the rulers and the ruled, including political and administrative ones, is reduced to a personal one. This relationship include loyalty and tacit submission to the ruler [3].

Another characteristic of *Erdoganism* is anti-elitist/populism, which is a kind of moralistic perception of politics, when society is divided into

morally holy and other parts. By other, the populists mean the corrupt ruling classes, as well as people with a different identity. In addition, populists are not only anti-elitist, but also anti-pluralist. They reject representative democracy and its institutions. They consider themselves the only legitimate representatives of the people. Those, who do not support them, are their enemies.

It should be noted that for populists, the authoritarianism and neopatrimonialism discussed above are proven methods of governing the country. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party also run the country in classic populist ways and methods. With the help of this doctrine, they divide society into honest citizens and a corrupt elite, while Erdogan positions himself as a people's politician. In addition, since 2011, the importance of the personality cult of Erdogan has increased, which put the issue of the savior of the nation, new Atatürk, on the agenda in modern *Turkiye* [4].

Erdogan, as a charismatic leader, actively uses nationalist rhetoric, striving to achieve utopian political goals both in domestic and foreign policy (for example, the revision of the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 and the return of some territories of the Ottoman Empire to *Turkiye*, which are now located within other sovereign states).

Part of Erdogan's political populism is also the repeated accusations of *Turkiye* by the West, as well as the United States, of participating in various conspiracies. The reason for Erdogan's anti-Western rhetoric is the creation of the image of an enemy for the West, the attempt that he successfully uses to strengthen his own positions in the domestic political arena and divert the attention of the population from the real problems of the country.

Islamism is a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups or organizations that have political goals. It should be noted that Islamists are exclusively rational actors who turn theological ideals into political points of view. They use ideology to win electoral votes and justify their policies once they come to power.

According to the ideology of Kemalism, Türkiye was a constitutional and secular republic, where the role of Islam in society was minimized. Nevertheless, Islam has not gone anywhere from Turkiyesh society. In Türkiye, Islam began to secretly strengthen itself after the coup on September 12, 1980 [5].

Islam began to gain visible strength in 2002, when the Islamist-oriented Justice and Development Party and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power in the country [5]. It was since this period when 17000 new mosques have been built in Türkiye. Today there are twice as many mosques in Türkiye as there are in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Since 2007, the vision of Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party has become exclusively Islamist, and after consolidating power in 2011 [6], the party embarked on an ambitious plan to islamize Türkiye society and politics. It should be noted that this process does not mean that Türkiye has become a theocratic state, since the religious establishment of the country is completely subordinate to politicians and does not have independent political positions. In addition, Islamists formulate their doctrines mainly from the national context, so the ideal form of government for them is either the Ottoman Sultanate, or the Sunni Caliphate, or the Shiite Imamate, depending on the respective nationality. This is explained in the strategic depth of A. Davitoglu, who attaches such great importance to the Ottoman past in the formation of both domestic and foreign policy and thus explains the fact of the formation of neo-Ottomanism as a new identity of the country as a whole.

Islamism, as well as its populism in the ideology of the new Türkiye, manifested itself in the country's foreign policy activities. After the failed coup d'état in Türkiye in 2016, Erdoğan's anti-Western rhetoric went so far that he directed the conflict between Muslim Türkiye and the Christian West into a religious-civilizational direction, what once again confirms the fact that his government uses religion for political purposes [7].

The country pays special attention to the fact of the formation of Türkiye national identity. The Erdoğan government dealt a revolutionary blow to the identity of the Turkiyesh nation created by Atatürk, which came as a shock to part of Turkiyesh society.

After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which was a multinational entity, Atatürk began to build a new Turkiyesh nation in order to prevent the further collapse of a weakened Türkiye. Anyone, who lived in the territory of the Republic of Türkiye and was born in this country, was a Turk. For hundreds of years, Turkiyesh nationalism was based on this paradigm, various ethnic minorities were secretly sacrificed to the process of solidity of the Turkiyesh nation, and the question of their origin gradually became taboo. In this regard, it is interesting to consider the opinion expressed by the President of Türkiye.

The President of Türkiye made the secret information base of registration of citizens of the State Security Service of the country publicly available. Every Türkiye citizen has been given the opportunity to know the origin of their ancestors since the mid-19th century to the present day. In just a few days since the launch of the base, 8 million Turks have researched their family tree. It turned out that until now some Turks had Armenian, Greek, Jewish, Laz and Arab origin.

This event reversed the policy of creating the identity of a single Türkiye nation that had existed since the time of Atatürk.

The confrontation between Kemalism and Erdoğanism was also reflected in foreign policy. Atatürk's European westernization has been replaced by Erdoğan's harsh anti-Western rhetoric and distancing from the Western world.

Today, Erdoğan is leading a liberation movement that should bring Türkiye out of the shadow of the West and give birth to a new, sovereign republican Türkiye, driven by its own democratic and independent interests.

An example of a retreat from the principles of Kemalism was the constitutional referendum held in Türkiye on April 16, 2017 by the ruling Justice and Development Party and its founder, President Erdogan. The electors voted for 18 amendments to the Turkish constitution, which included the transition from the country's parliamentary system to a presidential one, the abolition of the office of prime minister, as well as an increase in the number of parliamentary mandates from 550 to 600, and the reform of the Supreme Court and the Collegium of Prosecutors of Türkiye (HSYK) [8].

After the referendum, the president became head of state and government. He was given the power to appoint ministers and the vice-president. The President can issue decrees.

In fact, after this referendum, Kemalist Türkiye faced big challenges. It depends on the Turkish society which path republican Türkiye will choose in the future.

A striking example of the rejection of intercultural dialogue is the conversion of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul into a mosque.

According to the decision of the State Council of Türkiye dated July 10, 2020, Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque and Muslim services began here. The government reversed a 1934 decision to convert Istanbul's Hagia Sophia into a museum. As a result, Hagia Sophia, an important symbol of Christendom, became a mosque again.

This decision of Türkiye received a great response from the international community. The World Council of Churches called on Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to reverse the decision.

Former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo also urged the Turkish president to lift the sanctions. According to members of the US Senate, the Committee on Religious Affairs, Jim Rish and Robert Menendez, such an act by Erdogan was an insult to all Christians.

In response, the Turkish President stated that Hagia Sophia is a matter of Turkish sovereignty and no one can interfere in this matter; Erdogan also

noted that by changing the status of Hagia Sophia, the Turkish government corrected a historical mistake.

Events in Türkiye, including the first decade of the 21st century, have shown that the country is becoming a strong state. The question arises as to what extent it will continue to move forward along with democratic values, and to what degree it will retain public administration with the European values of Kemalism.

The main goal of Erdoganism is the creation of a neo-Ottoman state. Despite the fact that modern Türkiye does not consider itself a full-fledged successor to the Ottoman Empire, it wants to return the strength of the Ottoman era to the state, which is tantamount to changing the path of Kemalism.

We can say that the main difference between Kemal Atatürk and Erdogan is that the first one came to the head of government with the rank of military general, while Erdogan came through elections, a democratic mandate. Accordingly, here he encounters the greatest obstacle to his revolutionary intentions. The crisis in Türkiye was created precisely because of this fact. We can say that Turkish society is divided into two groups: pro-Erdogan and anti-Erdogan. And due to the fact that democracy is still very popular in Türkiye, this factor hinders the implementation of Erdogan's ideas, which, in turn, became the reason for Erdogan's anti-liberal approaches. He severely restricted democracy and liberalism in order to achieve his goals, and instead of caring about the development of a multicolored, pluralistic society, he began to arrest various opponents and give them the status of dissidents.

When comparing Kemalism and Erdoganism, it was revealed that there are both similarities and significant differences between these two political doctrines. There is resemblance between them in terms of authoritarianism, the neopatrimonial system and populism, as well as in the issue of nationalist rhetoric. The fundamental differences between them are expressed mainly in the replacement of

secularism by Islamism, which characterizes Kemalism. At the same time, the principle of westernization of Kemalism replaced the policy of separating Erdoganism from the West and making promises with it, what had a significant impact on the formation of the country's new political course.

2023 is a decisive year in the history of the Republic of Türkiye as the country celebrates its 100th anniversary. A striking example of this is the

presidential and parliamentary elections held on May 14 and 28, 2023, in which Recep Tayyip Erdogan won and was elected for a third term, which determined the future of a country of 85 million people for another five years. The President took the oath to the Turkish people and noted that, as President, he would defend his honor and decency before the Turkish people, history, independence and sovereignty of the state.

ისტორია

თანამედროვე თურქეთის ორი ძირითადი პოლიტიკური დოქტრინის ანალიზი

ე. მაკარაძე

ბათუმის შოთა რუსთაველის სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი, ჰუმანიტარულ მეცნიერებათა ფაკულტეტი, ბათუმი, საქართველო

(წარმოდგენილია აკადემიის წევრის რ. მეტრეველის მიერ)

თანამედროვე თურქეთის ორი ძირითადი პოლიტიკური დოქტრინის – „ქემალიზმის“ და „ერდოღანიზმის“ შესწავლა და ანალიზი განაპირობა იმან, რომ ქართული ისტორიოგრაფია ამ პრობლემას სათანადო ყურადღებას არ აქცევდა და აღნიშნულ პრობლემასთან დაკავშირებული ფუნდამენტური სამეცნიერო ნაშრომები არ არსებობს. წინამდებარე ნაშრომში უწყვეტ ჯაჭვში განვიხილავთ „ქემალიზმისა“ და „ერდოღანიზმის“ ანალიზს, რაც საკითხის როგორც ისტორიული ასპექტის, ისე მისი თანამედროვე რეალობის ვიზუალიზაციას შესაძლებელს გახდის. კვლევაში შევეცადეთ მკაფიო ხაზი გაგვევლო იმ პრობლემებზე, რომლებიც აქტიურად ჩნდებოდა მათ ურთიერთობაში. ნაშრომი ეხება თანამედროვე თურქეთის ორი ძირითადი პოლიტიკური დოქტრინის – „ქემალიზმის“ და „ერდოღანიზმის“ საკითხის შესწავლას კრიტიკული ანალიზის მეთოდის გამოყენებით. თანამედროვე თურქეთის ორი ძირითადი პოლიტიკური დოქტრინის – „ქემალიზმისა“ და „ერდოღანიზმის“ ანალიზმა და აღნიშნული საკითხების შესწავლამ მოგვცა საშუალება ნათლად გაგვეგო პრობლემის ძირითადი საკითხები და ისტორიული ასპექტები. ნაშრომში ცალ-ცალკეა გადმოცემული „ქემალიზმისა“ და „ერდოღანიზმის“ საკითხები და ახლებურად არის წარმოდგენილი თანამედროვე მიდგომები.

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