Central Caucaso-Asia: from Imperial to Democratic Geopolitics

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ABSTRACT. This paper deals with the rethinking of post-Soviet Central Eurasia. According to the approach, which arises from a Eurasianist conception of the region, drawing mainly on geography, equates Russia with Eurasia, an idea that has become popular and much debated in the post-Soviet period. If we proceed from the fact that the eight countries discussed here form two sub-regions – the Central Caucasus and Central Asia – the larger region, which includes both sub-regions, should be called the Central Caucaso-Asia. The term “Central Caucaso-Asia” reflects a conceptual idea of the interests of strengthening the local countries’ state sovereignty, which, in principle, contradicts the spirit and idea of Russo-centric Eurasianism.

Key words: Post-Soviet Central Eurasia, Central Caucaso-Asia, the Central Caucasus, Central Asia, Eurasianism.
geographical meaning [12: 222]. Here it should be said that the discussion of a possible compromise between the correct geographical term for Eurasia and the territory of Russia’s domination is still going on [12: 221]. Since the Russian geopolitical school relies on its own interpretation of Eurasia to justify Russia’s imperial ambitions, the term “Central Eurasia” needs specification: to what extent do its geographic and geopolitical interpretations coincide and what problems do they entail?

Traditionally, Central Eurasia as a geographic concept is related to the territory between the Bosphorus in the west and the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region in the east and from the Kazakh steppes in the north to the Indian Ocean in the south [13: 11]. This means that geographic Central Eurasia almost completely covers geographic Central Asia, but not Central Europe because Asia is much larger than Europe. For this reason Central Europe is left outside the conventional center (Central Eurasia) of the single continent called Eurasia. If, however, the physical dimensions of the continent’s parts are put aside, logic suggests that geographic Eurasia as a continent consists of two parts of the world (Europe and Asia). This means that geographically Central Eurasia should consist of both Central Europe and Central Asia and the Caucasian region as two links that connect them [14: 30-42; 15-17]. It seems that the geographic interpretation of the Central Eurasian concept is still dominated by its geopolitical interpretation, which equates Russia and Eurasia even in the post-Soviet era [12: 217].

Those who limit Central Eurasia to Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are still under the spell of Soviet approaches which leave vast territories, in particular Afghanistan, Northern Iran, the Northern Caucasus, Northwestern China, Cashmere, and the Tibetan Plateau, which share historical, ethnic, and cultural roots with the above countries beyond the region [13: 11-12].

While the Russian Eurasian school narrows down the scale of Eurasia as a geographic continent, the differences are less important in the case of Central Eurasia since the Russian geopolitical school is in control of geography.

Today academic circles (and not only them) are showing a great interest in studying the problems of the three Central Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia) [18: 287; 19: 9] and the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) within the same context. The vast region represented by these eight states is now called Central Eurasia [20: 2-3; 21: 206; 22: 117]. The same term is also applied to the same eight countries and Afghanistan [23]. Together with the five Central Asian states, it belongs to Greater Central Asia [24: 874; 25: 16; 26].

If we proceed from the fact that the eight republics discussed here form two sub-regions – the Central Caucasus and Central Asia – the larger region, which includes both sub-regions, can be called the Central Caucaso-Asia (in Russian, Kavkazia) [14-16]: this preserves the term “Central” as the key one for both regions, while the new term “Caucaso-Asia” is derived from two related terms “Caucasus” and “Asia.” If the term is applied to nine countries (the original eight and Afghanistan), the region should be called Greater Central Caucasian-Asia. This conception is already shared by others [27: 69].

We should not forget that Central Caucaso-Asia as a single region is not integrated because it has no political or cultural homogeneity [13: 13]. At the same time, its component parts have much in common, which makes it possible to regard them as a single region [23]. All the countries of Central Caucaso-Asia began their post-Soviet lives under more or less identical conditions, without the very much needed institutions of statehood, with a fairly low level of political culture, and a command-(read: communist)-type economy. These problems were reflected, to different extents, in the political and economic transformations in the Central Caucasian-Asian countries. Significantly, all these countries, with the exception of Kazakhstan, demonstrated a reverse dependence between rich hydrocarbon reserves and the pace of market reforms: the reserves obviously failed to stimulate economic reforms [28].

The Central Caucaso-Asia, to say nothing of the Greater Central Caucaso-Asia, has several conflict sub-regions on its territory [13], something that interferes, to various degrees, with economic progress in some of the countries; it also prevents the local countries from using local resources to move together in the desired direction.

The region’s rich hydrocarbon resources attract investments and tempt regional and world powers to politically dominate there [29]. Today, when energy policy is blending with the foreign policy of these powers, this is not merely understandable, but also inevitable [30]. At the same time, the Russian factor [31] is still very strong in the Central Asian countries’ energy policies: it seems that this part of the Soviet heritage cannot be eliminated soon.

The Central Caucasus and Central Asia are mutually complementary, which means that they can use their resources together: the West is interested in Central Asian
oil and gas, while the Central Caucasus not only wants to move its own oil and gas to the West, but also to use the energy (and not only) transportation corridor that connects the East and the West. This means that the Central Caucasus can serve as a bridge between Central Asia, a geopolitically closed region, and the West [32: 132].

It should be said in this context that, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Azerbaijan is the most important geopolitical pivot among all the others across the geographic continent of Eurasia [33: 41]. The “geopolitical pivot” status is determined by the country’s geographic location and its potential vulnerability to what the active geostrategic players might undertake in relation to it [33: 40]. By “active geostrategic players” I mean the states strong and determined enough to spread their domination beyond their limits.

By describing Azerbaijan as the “cork in the bottle” filled with the riches of the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, Mr. Brzezinski stresses: “The independence of the Central Asian states can be rendered nearly meaningless if Azerbaijan becomes fully subordinated to Moscow’s control” [33: 46-47, 129]. Kazakhstan is another of America’s target countries in Central Caucasian-Asia, which is amply illustrated by the Americans’ intention to maximize their investments there [34: 105].

The idea of post-Soviet state independence and its strengthening as the linchpin of state interests of the Central Caucasian-Asian states rule out their acceptance of not only Eurasianism, but also of the Heartland theory. They both assert their subordination to the imperial schemes of Russia and the West. In both cases, the interests of those countries which these imperial ambitions apply to, are left out of the picture. It is this, in our opinion, that shows the one-sidedness and, consequently, the limitations of both geopolitical constructs—the Heartland theory and Eurasianism. These geopolitical constructs fully blend into a so-called “imperial geopolitics” which explains somehow the relevance of elaborations on a so-called “democratic geopolitics” today [35: 22].

The leaders of those Central Caucasian-Asian countries who are seeking a tighter grip on power rather than stronger and developed state sovereignty, to say nothing of democratization, human rights, and a market economy, are prepared to embrace any theory (or rather pseudo-theory) to camouflage their true intentions or justify them.

It would be naive to expect the world and regional powers to step aside and leave Central Caucasian-Asia alone. Reality is much more complicated: these countries should carefully match their national interests and their choice of regional and world powers as partners.

Eurasianism clearly preaches Russia’s revival as an empire, but the even more moderate ideas now current in Russia do not exclude the “soft” alternative of imposing its interests on at least some of the local states, irrespective of their national interests.

The USA, on the other hand, is guided by objective considerations [33: 148-149]: far removed from the region, it cannot dominate over it and is strong enough not to become involved in unnecessary complications in this vast area.

From this it follows that America prefers a situation in which none of the countries dominates over Central Caucasian-Asia to allow the world community free financial and economic access to the region [33: 148-149].

American interests in the region are not limited to energy issues [36], which means that it will help the former Soviet republics overcome what remained of the Soviet economic system and promote the market economy and private sector as a solid foundation for economic growth and the rule of law. This will also help them to cope with social and ecological problems and profit from their energy resources and ramified export mainlines [37].

Some Russian experts admit that Moscow is holding forth about its historical, psychological, and other ties with former Soviet republics, while the United States rejects in principle any theories along the lines of “soft” or “limited” sovereignty of these republics [34: 108]. The Americans are convinced that Russia would profit from richer and more stable neighbors [34: 105].

The above suggests that America is not seeking integration with any of the regional countries; its policy completely corresponds to the local countries’ national interests rooted in strengthening and developing state sovereignty, deepening democratization, and enhancing the market economy.

The newly coined term “Central Caucasian-Asia” does not merely specify the region’s geographic identity: it is a conceptual idea of the interests of strengthening the local countries’ state sovereignty, which, in principle, contradicts the spirit and idea of Eurasianism. All the Eurasian deliberations about so-called “Caucaso-Asianism” as potentially a theoretical antipode of Eurasianism are absolutely wrong. This is explained by the political heterogeneity of Central Caucasian-Asia, not all the members of which have similar thoughts about state sovereignty and the road toward it. At the same time, developing and strengthening state sovereignty, deepening democratization, and confirming the principles of a market economy are not prerogatives of the Central Caucasian-Asian countries alone.
პოლიტიკური მეცნიერება

გეოპოლიტიკური კონცეფტი: მეთეთისის დანიშნულება დამოკიდებულობა

3. მეტად

სტატიის შენახვა საზოგადოების ტექნიკური ფუნქციონირების წესიდან გამომდინარე. ამ ფეროკომპლექსური ჯგუფის წესიდან გამომდინარე, როგორც გამოცხადება, რომ გახდა ამ ფეროკომპლექსი შენახვის დამოკიდებულობით საზოგადოების ტექნიკური ფუნქციონირება.

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